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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Identifying the humanness of a particular user of a Web page is crucial. Web robots consume
valuable bandwidth and perform automated actions, such as repeated attempts to log in to user
accounts. Studies suggest the Web robot to human ratio is as high as 10:1 regarding the number
of sessions opened on a Web server; and as high as 4:1 concerning bandwidth consumed on a
particular Web server [1].
This thesis explores the distinctions between humans and robots and the unique interactions
between humans and Web forms. The exploration defines Web robots and their uses, the behaviors
of different agents, traffic analysis between human and non-human robots, and various
identification mechanisms. This research also evaluates the differences between humans and
robots, and differences between multiple human actors.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Web Robots
There are two classifications of Web robots: non-malicious and malicious. Most current research
identifies Web robots based on Web-browsing patterns and resource requests. There has been
little research concerning how robots interact with Web forms. A later section of this thesis
analyzes collected data that details the interactions between Web robots and Web forms.
2.1.1 Non-Malicious Robots
Non-malicious Web robots normally take the form of a Web crawler; a robot that traverses Web
pages searching for pieces of information. There are several sub-classifications of Web crawlers.
These classifications include indexer, verifier, harvester, scraper, RSS crawler, experimental, and
unknown types [2].
2.1.1.1 Indexer
Indexer robots create a map of the Internet. These robots follow objects defined in a Website’s
robots.txt and links to create the map.
2.1.1.2 Verifier
Verifier robots verify or validate a set of functionality or rules of Web pages. Several examples
of verification are HTML verification, broken link detection, accessibility compliance, and quality
assurance testing.
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2.1.1.3 Harvester
Harvester robots do what their name implies; harvest content on Web pages. These types of
crawlers request resources such as images and documents.
2.1.1.4 Scraper
Scraper robots save requested HTML files. Malicious and non-malicious users purpose the saved
data for their own means. Malicious purposes include the gathering of email addresses for an
attempt to break into a Web page. Non-malicious purposes include gathering data for language
analysis and deep learning.
2.1.1.5 RSS Crawler
RSS crawlers keep up-to-date information from various RSS feeds. This crawler is often on a
schedule and refreshes the RSS feeds periodically.
2.1.1.6 Experimental
Experimental crawlers use a set of combined techniques to map, verify, or harvest data on the
Web.

These are naturally used for research or experimental purposes, hence the name

Experimental crawler.
2.1.1.7 Unknown
Other Web crawlers exist, however the function of these are outside of the scope of this thesis.
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2.1.2 Malicious Robots
Various robot types exhibit malicious intent. Malicious users automate tasks that take significant
time for a human to perform, increasing the efficacy of an attack. Some examples of malicious
robots include those that destroy or disrupt an online service.
2.1.2.1 Destructive
Destructive robots can cause harm to a Web server by performing operations such as filling up the
hard disk, registering many invalid users to take over the user-base, or exploit mechanisms of a
business for financial gain.
2.1.2.2 Disruptive
Some disruptive robots prevent Web servers from serving pages to legitimate users. A Denial of
Service attack prevents access to Web content by causing a Web server to execute too many I/O
requests, or floods a network with requests.
Spam robots are another form of disruptive robot. These robots generate information on an online
Web application, or send unwanted emails to an end user. The percentage of traffic that spam
robots generate has decreased over the previous years [3].
2.1.3 Distribution of Robots
Web robots account for most Web traffic, accounting for up to 61.5% of all Web traffic on the
Internet [3]. While Web crawlers are accountable for 20% to 31% of global Web traffic,
independent Web sites may see 50% or more of their own traffic generated by Web crawlers [3]
[4] [5]. Malicious robots account for as much as 5% of Internet traffic.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of traffic by robots. There are few resources that specify the
distribution of robot categories, however, two papers by Doren provide details on potential
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distributions of Web robots [2] [6]. Doren and his colleagues at the University of Connecticut
collected the data between 2007 and 2009.
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Figure 1 - Percentage of Robots by HTTP Requests

2.2 Determining Humanness
By assessing log files and form interactions, it is possible to identify non-human requests. Current
research suggests that various measures of internet-browsing patterns can identify robots. For
example, indexers often visit a robots.txt file on the Web server, where humans seldom visit this
resource. It is possible to determine potential robots by weighing the time between requests and
the time a robot interacts with a Web page. Evaluation of request headers and other common Webbrowser behaviors to gauge whether a user is a Web robot is promising. Several attributes used as
heuristic detection markers [7] are:
1) Did the user request the “robots.txt” file?
2) What is the time between requests?
3) What is the variance between request times?
4) Are there 404 response codes?
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5) Are there 400 response codes?
6) Does the request have a bot user-agent header?
7) Does the request have a user-agent header that does not match a common browser?
8) Do requests have the same or similar referrer for each page visited?
9) Does the URL resolution has high number of unresolved requests?
10) Is the HTTP version number included?
Comparing the requesting IP address to a list of IP addresses known to generate traffic via
autonomous agents can identify robot agents. For example, Google states their robots originate
from a DNS entry whose domain is googlebot.com or google.com. The address returned by doing
a hostname lookup for a potential robot is a value whose domain was as specified above. During
this writing, IP Address: 66.249.66.1 gives a hostname of “crawl-66-249-66-1.googlebot.com” and
is defined as a google crawler.
When machine learning algorithms are trained using the patterns of known Web robots,
autonomous agents can be identified. Classification techniques such as neural networks, support
vector machines, and decision trees are examples of these algorithms. This thesis later introduces
these algorithms and the results of these classifiers.
2.3 Behaviors of Agents
2.3.1 Human Behavior
Several mechanisms identify human behavior on the Web. These mechanisms assess Web page
access time, session costs, session length, and link following behavior [1] [7] [8] [9].
Humans seldom access multiple different Web pages within a single second. Human browsing
requires visual or auditory processing which results in much slower request times than automated
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agents. It is even rarer for humans to access different Web pages within a single half second. Web
browsers used by humans load additional resources such as images, script files, and other
multimedia content.
By requesting multimedia and script files, a typical human session costs more network bandwidth
and memory than a robot agent does. Robot agents tend to forgo these additional resources, as
they do not provide the resources that most robots require.
Session length, the number of Web page requests made by an agent, is an important criterion when
determining if an agent is human. Humans typically request fewer Web pages than robots in any
given session [1]. Humans regularly request fewer Web pages over a session because humans tend
to follow links of interest, instead of trying to index, or harvest data as robots do. Because humans
also process information more slowly than robots, the session times are longer for humans than
robots. Humans represent fewer accesses per time interval than robots, which means that the
number of requests per time interval is a good measure of humanness.
The way humans follow links is another criterion to consider. Human behavior regularly follows
a depth-first approach in following links, whereas robots usually perform a breadth first search.
Robots tend to queue links located on a Web page, which argues for why robots perform breadthfirst searches. Moreover, robots follow hidden links more often than do humans.
2.3.1.1 Predictability and Standard Behavior
Humans demonstrate several predictable behaviors when it comes to interacting with Web pages.
This section explores HTTP headers, network behavior patterns, and form interaction behaviors as
they pertain to human agents.
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HTTP headers that come from human agents are predictable, meaning they tend not to differentiate
in the number or type of headers sent. Wild HTTP headers were captured using a data-capturing
website. The methodology of this research explores the way that this Web site captures data and
discusses how the data is analyzed. Data collected by this Web site shows that many Web crawlers
do not submit a cookie header if prompted to send one back to the server; most human agents
return this header. The tables below show this behavior for human and robot agents (cells are
shaded to aid reading). Only the human responds with the required cookie. The Data Capture
Web Site sends a response header “Set-Cookie”, which only human agents seem to respect when
performing additional requests during a session. See Table 1 below.
IP Address URL
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37

http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/

76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37
76.26.211.37

http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/

Header Name
X-REWRITE-URL
Upgrade-InsecureRequests
User-Agent
Host
Accept-Language
Accept-Encoding
Accept
Connection
X-REWRITE-URL
Upgrade-InsecureRequests
User-Agent
Referrer
Host
Cookie
Accept-Language
Accept-Encoding
Accept

Date and Time
2015-10-25 19:39:40.310
2015-10-25 19:39:40.310
2015-10-25 19:39:40.310
2015-10-25 19:39:40.310
2015-10-25 19:39:40.310
2015-10-25 19:39:40.310
2015-10-25 19:39:40.310
2015-10-25 19:39:40.310
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640
2015-10-25 19:39:53.640

Table 1 - Human Headers during a session on the Data Capture Web Site

Table 1 contrasts with Table 2 in that Table 1 displays the human returning a header, whereas
Table 2 exhibits robot behavior that does not resend the header.
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IP Address
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194
91.121.169.194

Url
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/

Name
Connection
Accept
Accept-Language
Host
User-Agent
X-REWRITE-URL
Connection
Accept
Accept-Encoding
Accept-Language
Host
User-Agent
X-REWRITE-URL

Date and Time
2015-09-29 20:00:43.097
2015-09-29 20:00:43.097
2015-09-29 20:00:43.097
2015-09-29 20:00:43.097
2015-09-29 20:00:43.097
2015-09-29 20:00:43.097
2015-09-29 20:00:46.537
2015-09-29 20:00:46.537
2015-09-29 20:00:46.537
2015-09-29 20:00:46.537
2015-09-29 20:00:46.537
2015-09-29 20:00:46.537
2015-09-29 20:00:46.537

Table 2 - "MJ12bot" Robot headers during a session on the Data Capture Web Site

Humans tend to request HTTP resources from the main Web page and subsequent visited pages.
Web page markup exposes resources meant for observation. Standard Web browser requests
submit referrer headers, which create a logical click path as the user navigates a Web site. This is
due to the agent following links readily available on the web page and by using normal browser
controls, such as forward and back. The following table contains a subset of a captured human
click path.
IP Address
202.67.36.228
202.67.36.228
202.67.36.228
202.67.36.228
202.67.36.228
202.67.36.228
202.67.36.228

Referrer
/
/Home/Contact
/
/
/
/
/Home/About

URL
/Home/Contact
/
/
/
/Home/About
/Home/About
/

Request Type
GET
GET
POST
POST
GET
GET
GET

Date and Time
2015-09-11 23:06:44.863
2015-09-11 23:06:59.940
2015-09-11 23:07:53.200
2015-09-11 23:08:02.497
2015-09-11 23:08:15.857
2015-09-11 23:08:16.247
2015-09-11 23:08:21.093

Table 3 - Human click path

Patterns have identifiable differences in human and robotic network behavior [6] [10] [11]. For
example, when human agents access Web pages they tend to create a single HTTP request. If the
server load is too high to handle requests in a timely manner, the user often does not continue to
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make HTTP requests. Conversely, a robot does not care if response times are long and continues
to attempt to access the resource from the Web server [10].
2.3.2 Robot behavior
2.3.2.1 Access Materials not generally seen by humans
Some crawlers attempt to access any resource available to them [11]. Resource availability is
assessed through different mechanisms such as if the resource appearing with a direct link from
the Web page, from another resource (such as robots.txt), through trying to access resources from
a search engine or other site’s links, or by randomly trying to access resources known to exist
(login pages, configuration files, etc.) [6] [11].
Based on the logs from the Data Capture Web Site, it was determined that a robot attempts to
access denied resources as defined in the robots.txt. Only one agent accessed denied resources; it
was likely trying to enumerate resources, which could provide administrative access. Most ethical
bots, such as the Google bot and Bing bot, did not attempt to access the resources marked as deny.
2.3.2.2 Resource Access Times vs Interaction Time
As presented earlier, Web page access times allow for the identification of robots. Robots tend to
access several Web pages very quickly, usually within a fraction of a second. Human users, while
they are able to access resources at such speeds, do not usually do so. Human browsing time tends
to be over one-half second per page request, whereas robots would have made numerous requests
for resources in this time [1].
Another item of interest concerning resource access times is the identification of robots via their
access of Image files compared to HTML files. Most crawlers, excluding harvesters, tend not to
grab images. Instead, these robots often prefer items of a smaller size such as text files and Web
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pages [6]. Normal human browsing requests every image on the page, if images exist. Robots
tend to exclude these images. AlNoamany, et al., consider the ratio of 10 Web page requests to <
1 image request to be robot-like, and the inverse of human behavior [1].
2.3.3 Current Measures to Prevent Invalid Agents
This section covers currently practiced methods that prevent invalid, or unauthorized, agents from
accessing systems or resources. These methods include attempts to prevent robot access and
attempts to prevent unauthorized accesses to resources and materials.
2.3.3.1 Primary authentication and verification methods
Most robot prevention takes place when an agent attempts to submit a Web form. The most
common of these is CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and
Humans Apart).

Other methods for authentication and user verification include form

authentication, Kerberos authentication, and external authentication methods.
2.3.3.1.1 CAPTCHA
CAPTCHA is the most widely used tool to prevent automatic entry of Web forms. This section
provides a brief overview of CAPTCHA; however, the implementation details are beyond the
scope of this thesis. The basis of its use is simple: create a scenario, which is difficult for robots
to process correctly, but effortless for humans to do. While initially just asking the user to type
the text in a distorted image, CAPTCHA has gone through several different iterations throughout
the years. One subsequent iteration of CAPTCHA is reCAPTCHA. To improve on CAPTCHA,
reCAPTCHA allows for additional character distortions, rotations, and spacing. Unfortunately, as
robots have become more capable of reading text on an image, humans continue to struggle with
reading the text. Ease-of-use methods for CAPTCHA and reCAPTCHA were explored, as well as
an attempt to make use of the human generated data. Ease-of-use methods, such as asking the user
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to click an image or widget, or choose a set of images that match a description are currently in use.
CAPTCHA and reCAPTCHA use the data gathered from the initial methods to digitize text, aid
in machine learning, and describe various images.
There are currently robots able to read most CAPTCHA images with a high success rate, some of
which are commercially available. As the prevalence of robots increases, the demand for robot
detection changes dramatically. Robots have bypassed even the new methods of CAPTCHA.
Next, several common authentication methods that validate a user are explored.
2.3.3.1.2 Form Authentication
Form authentication, and Internet basic authentication, requires the user to enter a username and
password combination before allowing access to resources of the Web page.
The idea of password authentication has been in existence for millennia and is the most common
form of user authentication. Security measures are beginning to include secondary-authentication
methods. Secondary authentication helps prevent unauthorized access from different entities,
when malicious users compromise usernames and passwords.
In the research conducted for this thesis, form authentication was the authentication measure
utilized to authenticate users.
2.3.3.1.3 Kerberos Authentication
Kerberos is another popular authentication method used when accessing Web applications. This
verification method uses a domain controller system to authenticate agents.
authentication for the domain controller to the agent.
The basic process for Kerberos authentication is as follows:

This ensures
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1. A client requests credentials for a server from the domain controller.
2. The domain controller gives the client the credentials, which include a session password,
encrypted with the client’s password (held by the domain controller).
3. The client transmits the identity to the server using the session key provided by the domain
controller.
4. The server then authenticates the information as valid, and allows the client to proceed.
As further protection, the use of a ticket-granting server to supply authentication tickets is used.
Ticket-granting servers allow sessions to maintain associated tickets, which are valid for only a
limited duration and are invalidated at the request of the ticket-granting server. [12]
NTLM-Authentication (Windows Authentication or challenge/response) is a similar technology,
developed by Microsoft. Kerberos Authentication is considered to be an authentication protocol
superior to NTLM-Authentication, partially due to its ability to provide mutual authentication and
grant tickets for a limited duration.
2.3.3.1.4 External Authentication Methods
Additional authentication methods can use an external host to provide credentials to a system if
that user has credentials with the external host. The most frequently used authentication method
of this type is OAuth. Corporations such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter use OAuth.
OAuth authentication is similar to Kerberos Authentication. There is a trusted authentication
provider, a client requesting access, and a resource server. The resource server contains the
resource that the client is attempting to access. Using the same method as does Kerberos, the client
requests credentials - known as tokens - from the authentication server and presents them to the
resource server. The resource server, once presented with a token, can verify whether the
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credentials were provided by the authentication server based on various cryptographic details
provided by a pre-established set of cryptographic keys or other information [13].
2.3.3.2 Secondary Authentication
Since form authentication is the most common authentication type available on the Web, there is
inherent potential for an unauthorized user using stolen credentials. To counter this, there are
various secondary authentication measures, which are widely used on the internet today. These
methods send a message to a known external communication device and ask the user to enter a
challenge response. A challenge response value contains the content provided in the external
communication message. To send these messages, SMS and email are often used. Some
authentication tools include key-fobs that generate a password, or part of a password, on a timed
interval.
While these secondary measures are highly effective in preventing unauthorized access to
machines, they are still cumbersome for the end user. This thesis presents a case that allows human
typing pattern analysis to perform automatic secondary authentication and unencumbered by
secondary devices. The value of this is that typing patterns are unique to every human, as they
rely on his or her biological movement characteristics. Robots, on the other hand, perform
computed and rapid input patterns, which are easier to detect.
2.4 Determining Uniqueness between Human Agents
Numerous methods of authentication exist to enhance internet security and local security. High
security enterprises need many layers of authentication. These enterprises include military,
government, and companies that handle sensitive information. As a second line of defense,
security divisions often introduce additional measures to increase the certainty of authentication.
Some of these already mentioned are “something you know” (username/password) and “something
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you own” (cellphone/email/smartcard). The following section looks at biological methods to
identify an agent, known as “something you are.”
2.4.1 Biological Differences
There are several universal ways to identify humans using biometric information. These types of
identifications include fingerprint uniqueness, iris (eye) uniqueness, hand dimensions, voice
evaluation, and signature uniqueness [14] [15] [16] [17]. An active area of research is the
evaluation of computer interaction signatures – namely typing patterns and mouse movement
patterns. While this thesis addresses several topics, an in-depth evaluation is only included for
computer interaction signatures.
Sophisticated security systems rely on the exploitation of aforementioned uniqueness inherent in
human users. The distinctiveness and permanence of traits in an organism are the bases for
biological identification.

Although most literature suggests that behavioral traits are weak

biometric traits, it is possible to enhance security significantly by introducing these traits as byproducts of authentication. The Internet currently lacks broad support for the use of other
identification methods, as those methods require specialized hardware and software. However,
Web authentication may soon use face and voice recognition, as HTML5 and devices with
multimedia components become commonplace.
2.4.1.1 Fingerprints
It is common knowledge that fingerprint patterns can accurately identify an individual. Effectively
matching fingerprints to an individual can accurately identify that individual.
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2.4.1.2 Signature
Day-to-day business transactions often use handwritten signatures. Due to the number of intraclass variants of characters in handwriting over time, it is difficult to classify a person by his or
her signature. Specialized hardware components analyze speed, shape, and pressure during the act
of signing to increase the effectiveness of determining the handwritten signature. However, the
adoption of this method of analysis is rare, as it requires external hardware.
2.4.1.3 Computer Interaction Signature
While handwritten signature capturing requires specialized hardware, computer interaction
signatures require only standard input mechanisms used during computer interaction, such as a
keyboard or mouse.

Since these hardware components are already part of most personal

computing systems, the convenience of implementing this evaluation becomes more viable.
Suggested by Jain and Kumar [17], biometric evaluation should encompass a few inherent traits:
user convenience, data acquisition environment, and data acquisition quality.

Standard

mechanisms available on the Internet are able to provide all of these traits. Utilizing standard input
devices provides user convenience, while additional information is gathered using custom
JavaScript behind the scenes. The data acquisition environment is also provided, due to the same
reasons as user convenience. Most interactions with a Web page allows for tracking any input
mechanic, therefore, data acquisition must quickly adjust to support various metrics.
Capturing keystroke dynamics is possible by embedding additional biometric controls on a
standard login form. This allows for effective capture of biometrics as though an agent filled out
parts of the login page, which captures usernames and passwords.

24
Keystroke dynamics are captured efficiently through mechanisms provided by modern Web
browsers. JavaScript event listeners capture keystroke down events and keystroke release events.
By capturing these two mechanics, significant information is gathered on how a user’s muscle
memory and typing patterns are utilized for identification.
Identifying a user requires a model, which contains the quantum information captured:


Time a key is pressed (Down Time)



Time between the previous key is pressed and subsequent key is pressed



Time the first key is released (Release Time)

These keystroke dynamics create a model using these criteria for every key pressed during
interaction with the form.
In Table 4 below, a user types a simple password “HELLO”. The information gathered here is
useful to evaluate the typing pattern of the particular agent.
Key
Down Time (ms)
Release Time
(ms)

H

E

L

L

O

0

84

140

251

334

114

184

205

307

402

Table 4 - Password times between keystrokes

In order to visualize this information, Figure 2 is provided for convenience.
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50
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Password Times between Keystrokes

O

Axis Title
Down Time (ms)

Release Time (ms)

Figure 2 - Visual representation of typed characters

This information is used to create a series of metrics, which include the duration for which a key
is held and the time until following key is pressed. Negative values in the time between press and
release indicate that the subsequent key was pressed before the previous key was released; positive
values specify a key was released before the succeeding key was pressed. This additional step aids
in authentication, as the data now contains overlap information. Table 5 is shown below.
Key
Held Time (ms)
Time between press and
previous key released (ms)

H

E

L

L

O

114

100

65

56

68

0

-30

-44

46

27

Table 5 - Differences in time based on when a key is pressed and the previous key released

There are two axis points displayed in Figure 3, which allow for classification later. The
alternating values of key-down time and time between keypresses are used to generate a timing
vector that serves as classification training data.
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Figure 3 - Pattern of the transformed data that has been captured.

The timing vector of this sample is [114, 0, -30, 100, -44, 65, 46, 56, 27, 68]. Some researchers,
such as Cho [18], add a keystroke to supplant additional values at the end of the timing vector by
pressing the return key. The implementation provided in this research supplants zero as the second
value of the dataset to indicate the start of initial data capture, although this value could be omitted.
Several mechanisms exist to classify a user’s keystroke dynamics. Researchers capture and apply
this data for use in backpropagation neural networks. Results as low as 2% false acceptance rate
(FAR) and false rejection rates (FRR) have been achieved [19] [18]. Another user identification
method is to create a master trajectory profile that categorizes a user based on the amount of
dissimilarity encountered. Results have reached FAR and FRR as low as 4% using this method
[20].
Including additional measures to increase the number of inputs is also achievable. Garg [21]
advocates using meta-key information such as key type change (alpha to numeric) and the number
of times the backspace key, shift key, and caps lock key are pressed during data entry.
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Shanmugapriya [22] suggests the creation and use of a new measure called “Virtual Key Force” –
a measure that takes into account the time between key presses and the distance between keys
being pressed. Zhong, et al. [23] also use distances as additional metrics; however, their research
suggests the typical use of Manhattan distance is insufficient, as it does not scale properly.
Alternatively, Zhong suggests a hybrid approach of using Manhattan distance and Mahalanobis
distance.
The initial presentation of the sample data in Table 4 only considers the key press and hold duration
times. To create a superior model of an individual’s behavioral patterns, measures are added to
increase the number of data points. Every keystroke is captured including shift, caps lock, and
control keys as normal key inputs, in the model presented later in this thesis. These additional
keys are used to model the user’s input.
While many researchers claim that backpropagation is a superb tool for determining a user’s
validity, there remains the aspect of training the model appropriately [18] [19] [23] [24] [25] [26].
Real systems may find it difficult to train a neural network properly, as the network must be
retrained for every new user [24]. Even with continuous integration of valid user authentication
data, the neural network training requires valid and invalid login attempts to identify agents
adequately. It is prohibitively expensive for production systems to retrain a model every time a
user is created, due to the training needs of neural networks.
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CHAPTER 3
PURPOSE
This thesis analyzes the behaviors present in both human and robot agents through Web form
interaction. By comparing human and robot agents, the potential for reduction in internet traffic
and fraudulent impersonation of human can be mitigated. An attempt to identify pragmatic
measures using biometric measures as a secondary authentication is also tested.
If successful, the discrimination between humans and robots relieves humans of the need to
perform secondary authentication measures such as CAPTCHA. Instead of having an active
system to determine humanness, these measures should be evaluable automatically through
biometric evaluation. The enhanced security mechanisms present in biometrics will enable web
applications to become more secure against fraudulent login attempts.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
To apply an automatic secondary authentication measure for Web applications that requires no
additional user input, a Web application was created. This Web application captures a visiting
agent’s HTTP headers, session information, and meta-information relating to keyboard and mouse
inputs. The information was subsequently used to identify robot agents and compare human agent
biometric signatures. The next step is to perform formal research into these various behavioral
patterns, as will be discussed in this section.
4.1 Web site to track inputs
A data capture Web application was created with the intent on capturing aspects of human and
robot behavior. The Web site can be found on the public Internet at http://www.trytologin.com.
All software development efforts were done in C#, JavaScript, CSS, and HTML for the
application. This Web page captures HTTP headers, IP Addresses, and form interaction behaviors
such as key presses and mouse clicks. A sample of each of these data points is provided in Tables
6, 7, 8, and 9.
Table 6 displays one agent’s request headers that visited the Data Capture Web Site.
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Name
Connection
Accept
Accept-Encoding
Accept-Language
Host

User-Agent
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests

Value
keep-alive
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;
q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
gzip, deflate, sdch
en-US,en;q=0.8
localhost:20151
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/46.0.2490.42 Safari/537.36
1

Date Created
9/28/2015 3:58 AM
9/28/2015 3:58 AM
9/28/2015 3:58 AM
9/28/2015 3:58 AM
9/28/2015 3:58 AM

9/28/2015 3:58 AM
9/28/2015 3:58 AM

Table 6 - Sample Request Headers

Table 7 displays that same agent’s IP address, referrer, and request type. This request shows that
this particular agent submitted information to the Data Capture Web Site.
Date Saved
IP Address
Referrer
Url
Request Type
9/28/2015 3:58 AM 76.26.211.37 http://trytologin.com http://trytologin.com POST
Table 7 - Sample request information

Table 8 shows the keystroke dynamics by the agent.
Key Pressed
72
69
76
76
79
72
69
76
76
79

Element
Name
Email
Email
Email
Email
Email
Password
Password
Password
Password
Password

Alt

Ctrl
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Shift
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Time
Released
112
144
408
144
192
2647
2695
369
152
160

Table 8 - Sample input capture (Keyboard)

Similar to Table 8, Table 9 shows the mouse click interactions by the agent.

Time
Pressed
0
-32
312
40
88
2520
-63
288
56
80
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MouseX
581
582
664
561

MouseY
240
195
265
331

Button
0
0
0
0

Element
Name
Password
Email
Password
submit

Time Pressed
9/27/2015 11:58 PM
9/27/2015 11:58 PM
9/27/2015 11:58 PM
9/27/2015 11:58 PM

Table 9 - Sample input capture (Mouse)

4.1.1 How information is collected and used
As stated above, many of the users’ interactions are captured during the browsing session that the
users perform. All information is stored and submitted in a database; the schema is shown in
Figure 4.
The only information used to validate a user were the keystroke patterns that were entered. Since
only keystrokes were used to validate users, this mechanism should be treated as a secondary
authentication metric.
4.1.1.1 Form Input

Figure 4 - Image of the data capture application

The Web server receives captured data submitted from a normal HTML form. Keystroke and
mouse dynamics are captured through user interaction, and are submitted with the form when the
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user pressed the submit button. The user only needs to interact with normal login fields, while no
additional interaction is necessary to capture keystroke and mouse data.
Interacting with email and password elements inserts hidden inputs into the form. The information
captured by this form is comprised of mouse click metrics, key press metrics, and information
about which form element is being acted on at the time. The agent submits data to the Web server
that stores the information in a database. Sections of this thesis that follow use these hidden inputs
to determine the uniqueness of human agents. Refer to Table 8 - Sample input capture (Keyboard)
and Table 9 - Sample input capture (Mouse) for sample input data.

4.1.1.2 Database Schema
The database architecture used to capture and store data from the application is Microsoft SQL
Server 2014. Figure 5 - Data Capture Database Schema provides the name, datatype, and nullable
properties for each column. The ID column on each table represents that table’s Primary Key
(PK). Any field suffixed with “_id” represents a Foreign Key (FK) to the appropriate table.
The ApplicationRequestContexts table contains high-level information pertaining to each request.
RequestHeaders has a many-to-one relation with ApplicationRequestContexts and tracks each
HTTP header per request. MouseInteractions and KeyboardInteractions contain a many-to-one
relationship with FormInteractions and track mouse and keyboard metrics, respectively.
FormInteractions maintains a one-to-one relationship with ApplicationRequestContexts and acts
as a parent table to MouseInteractions and KeyboardInteractions. The FormInfo table contains the
raw input fields that the user submitted to the Web server and has a one-to-one relationship with
ApplicationRequestContexts.
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MouseInteractions
Column Name

Condensed Type

Nullable

Id

int

No

TimePressed

datetime

No

MouseX

int

No

MouseY

int

No

FormInteraction_Id

int

Yes

Button

int

No

ElementName

nvarchar(10)

No

DateCreated

datetime

Yes

FormInteractions
Column Name

Condensed Type

Nullable

Id

int

No

DateCreated

datetime

Yes

ApplicationRequestContexts
Column Name

KeyboardInteractions
Column Name

Condensed Type

Nullable

Id

int

No

KeyPressed

int

No

FormInteraction_Id

int

Yes

ElementName

nvarchar(10)

No

AltPressed

bit

No

CtrlPressed

bit

No

ShiftPressed

bit

No

DateCreated

datetime

Yes

TimeReleased

decimal(18, 2)

Yes

TimePressed

decimal(18, 2)

No

Condensed Type

Nullable

Id

int

No

Saved

datetime

No

IpAddress

nvarchar(MAX)

Yes

Referrer

nvarchar(MAX)

Yes

Url

nvarchar(MAX)

Yes

RequestType

int

No

FormInteraction_Id

int

Yes

DateCreated

datetime

Yes

SignInStatus

int

No

RequestHeaders
Column Name

FormInfo
Column Name

Condensed Type

Nullable

Id

int

No

Name

nvarchar(MAX)

Yes

Value

nvarchar(MAX)

Yes

ApplicationRequestContext_Id

int

Yes

DateCreated

datetime

Yes

Figure 5 - Data Capture Database Schema

Condensed Type

Nullable

Id

int

No

Name

nvarchar(MAX)

Yes

Value

nvarchar(MAX)

Yes

ApplicationRequestContext_Id

int

Yes

DateCreated

datetime

Yes
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4.2 Web Robot Traffic Generation
Several commercial automatic applications were used to generate reproducible automated traffic.
Many of these tools incorporate different methods to interact with Web forms, and try to mimic
human behavior.
Besides the capture of commercially available Web robots, wild Web robots interacted with the
Web site and their information was captured.
4.2.1 Commercial Automated Options
Several different commercially available programmable Web agents were used to generate traffic
that submitted the Web form on the Data Capture Web Site. The agents used were Visual Studio
Web Tests, Selenium, iMacros, and Sahi.
4.2.1.1 Visual Studio Web Tests
Visual Studio, a professional-grade development environment, provides methods to create
automation tools. For the Web, however, Visual Studio does not allow for direct interaction with
the Web page; instead, it opts to send HTTP POST requests with predefined parameters.
4.2.1.2 Selenium
Selenium is an open source Web testing framework used to automate tasks, and is widely used in
the automation industry. It interacts with a Web browser to perform automated tasks. Since this
runs commands through a browser, typical browser headers are shown.
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4.2.1.3 iMacros
iMacros is a browser automation tool. This tool also uses a real Web browser to perform work
and sends standard header information for each request.
4.2.1.4 Sahi
Sahi is another automation framework, which uses a Web browser to perform automated steps.
4.2.2 Human Biometrics Sample Data Points
It is crucial to collect a steady sample of data that is used to test the efficacy of different
classification algorithms. For each of the experiments performed, the inclusion of six valid login
attempts was used for training and an additional known login attempt was used for verification.
Some of the algorithms used require additional training to classify the login attempt correctly; in
such cases, an additional known invalid login attempt and several randomly generated login
attempts were captured. For these tests, the simple password of “hello” was used. The various
input parameters are shown below.
In Tables 10, 11, and 12, the columns prefixed with “H:” indicate the duration a particular key was
held, and columns prefixed with “RT:” indicate the time after the previous key was released. If
the “RT” columns are negative, the previous key was not released when the key was pressed. All
times are represented in milliseconds.
Table 10, shows the set of six known valid login attempts used to train models. This data is used
in the training of each classification algorithm to determine if the same user is attempting to login
to the Web application.
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Attempt
Attempt 1
Attempt 2
Attempt 3
Attempt 4
Attempt 5
Attempt 6

RT:
''
0
0
0
0
0
0

H: 'h'
112
96
152
87
121
112

RT:
'h'
-32
87
-87
225
32
-32

H: 'e'
144
184
191
337
144
144

H: 'l'
408
456
393
353
311
408

RT: 'e'
312
376
304
272
231
312

H: 'l'
144
152
143
151
153
144

RT: 'l'
40
56
40
46
48
40

H: 'o'
192
168
193
183
187
192

RT: 'l'
88
96
89
64
88
88

Table 10 - Valid Login Attempts

Table 11 shows additional captured logins that are used to help validate the model. Validation
rules indicate the invalid login should be marked as invalid when validating and the valid login
should be marked as valid.
Attempt
Invalid
Attempt
Valid Attempt

H: 'h'

RT: ''

H: 'e'

RT: 'h'

H: 'l'

RT: 'e'

H: 'l'

RT: 'l'

H: 'o'

RT: 'l'

112
152

0
0

168
184

-48
-72

104
368

24
296

168
152

55
49

136
137

56
41

Table 11 - Additional Known Attempts

Many of the tests require additional training in order to build an accurate classification profile.
The randomly generated attempts shown in Table 12 are used to simulate invalid login attempts to
the Web server.
Generated #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

H: 'h'
197
18
138
129
19
74
219
182
176
41

RT: ''
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

H: 'e'
32
55
98
5
128
134
29
63
177
69

RT: 'h'
-237
140
-81
154
-83
115
-46
-99
62
106

H: 'l'
111
146
153
129
234
138
162
240
221
31

RT: 'e'
-112
161
-231
29
177
149
-4
80
123
-46

Table 12 - A sample of randomly generated login attempts

Figures 6 and 7 present the known valid and invalid records.

H: 'l'
223
60
240
84
147
48
40
219
66
206

RT: 'l'
-63
47
-166
185
14
-156
-103
-144
147
-85

H: 'o'
62
240
183
47
233
16
110
4
16
97

RT: 'l'
71
214
-98
112
160
-167
182
-47
-101
165
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Key Hold Times with Fake Login
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Figure 6 - Key Hold Times with Fake Login

Key Press Times with Fake Login
Time in milliseconds
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Figure 7 - Key Press Times with Fake Login

4.3 Comparison Methods
Once sufficient data was gathered, several different machine learning and classification algorithms
were trained and tested to determine if low-volume training sufficed to determine login validity
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based on key dynamic metrics.

The methods used to create the validation models are

backpropagation, support vector machines, decision trees, and dissimilarity comparison.
4.3.1 Backpropagation
Backpropagation has been a topic for many researchers who attempt to authenticate users via
keyboard dynamics [19, 18, 20]. In some of the reports, backpropagation has the potential to
provide accurate results regarding the amount of training provided.
In the research for this thesis, data was gathered by a Web application created to do so. User’s
typed password strokes were captured during several login attempts.

In this way, a

backpropagation neural network was trained using the C# programming language and
AForge.Neuro neural network libraries [27].
Several potential models were created to train the model. The backpropagation model was trained
using the valid training samples described above and 100 to 2000 generated invalid logins.
The backpropagation network was configured as follows:


Number of inputs: 10



Number of inner layers: between one and five



Number of neurons per layer: between one and 1000



Number of outputs: 1

This method required the use of 10 inputs, as per the number of features in the sample set, between
one and five inner layers with between one and 1000 neurons in each layer, and one output. The
classification of a result is valid if the neural network gave an output >= 0. The classification of a
result is invalid if the result were less than 0.
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4.3.2 Support Vector Machines
Support vector machines add reliable classifications to a data model. While exploring various
methodologies to perform classifications, this classification system seemed promising for many
types of analysis. The implementation of a support vector machine was used to gauge the
effectiveness of this model of input.
Using Accord.Neuro framework [28], the support vector machine evaluated was a kernel support
vector machine, which had the following parameters:


Number of inputs: 10



Kernel: Gaussian with a sigma of 100



Learning Algorithm: sequential minimal optimization

The tests run for the SVM ran 1000 times to gain an average baseline. These tests used the set of
valid inputs and the known invalid input for training the SVM. Most tests used a set of randomly
generated data to train as invalid login attempts. The tests included either 0, 10, 100, or 1000
randomly generated inputs to use during training. Once training finished, 10,000 login attempts
were classified. The classification of a result is valid if the SVM gave an output >= 0. The
classification of a result is invalid if the result was less than 0.
4.3.3 Decision Trees
When training the decision trees, several different parameters regarding invalid testing data were
evaluated. The decision tree engine used the C45 algorithm, ten inputs, and continuous variables
ranging from -10000 to 10000. Training of the engine included six valid logins, one invalid login,
and 10,000 generated invalid login attempts. Results obtained from this initial model encouraged
the use of additional training using randomly generated invalid logins. Experiments were then
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performed using training by 1, 10, 100, 1000, and 5000 randomly generated invalid logins. The
classification of a result is valid if the SVM gave an output of one. The classification of a result
is invalid if the result were equal to zero.
4.3.4 Dissimilarity Comparison
A dissimilarity comparison function compares known inputs to build a generalized model with
various statistics and compares these values against an attempted validation.
The general approach of this comparison has its base in statistical modeling. Several valid login
attempts were captured to create a master model, also known as a master trajectory. Five known
valid inputs were used to create the initial model during the initial implementation of the algorithm.
The average value for all known features was calculated and stored as if it was a single valid login
when creating this master trajectory. Comparison of each valid login attempt to the master
trajectory was used to calculate average dissimilarity and standard deviation. Comparison of
average dissimilarity against any additional input to perform verification takes place once this
model was created.
The set of inputs for an attempted login comprises the time a key is pressed, and the previous key
is released. The values are stored in an array of numeric values such as [80, 0, 134, -31, 55, 210
…].
These data points are plotted on a Cartesian map to create the known dissimilarity profile; for the
sample just provided: [{X = 80, Y = 0}, {X = 134, Y = -31}, {X = 55, Y = 210} …].
Equation 1 shows the general equation for calculating the dissimilarity between two profiles (M
and A).
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𝑛

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑀,𝐴) = ∑ √(𝑀𝑥𝑖 − 𝐴𝑥𝑖)2 + (𝑀𝑦𝑖 − 𝐴𝑦𝑖)2
𝑖=1

Equation 1 - Dissimilarity Equation

The equations shown in Equation 2 show the evaluation criteria needed in order to validate if a
user has typed in the same manner as his or her previous attempts.
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + (𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
𝐼𝑠𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑛(𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡) = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡) ≤ 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
Equation 2 – Valid login Function using Dissimilarity method

When a new login attempt takes place, the dissimilarity between the new attempt and the master
trajectory are calculated. This calculation is then compared against an evaluation threshold. If the
dissimilarity of the attempt is less than the evaluation threshold, the user is authenticated.

42
CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
All data used for analysis can be found at https://goo.gl/zkP3TE. Note that this link requires a
Georgia Southern University login to access the information.
5.1 Traffic Analysis
Clues exist to identify agents as human or robotic when evaluating the traffic generated from the
Web application. Most of the indexer robots that accessed the application had some identifier in
the HTTP request header. However, other factors should be evaluated, including the inter-page
accesses and form information gathered by form submissions.
5.1.1 HTTP Headers and Access Times
It is possible to identify robot agents through the evaluation of HTTP headers. However, with
more sophisticated robot agents, these headers appear as valid user requests. As described in the
introduction, there is some disparity between what Web browsers and robot agents submit as HTTP
headers. By utilizing the Data Capture Web Site, the exclusion or inclusion of certain field headers
quickly identifies potential robotic agents. However, it is more difficult to identify human agents
from one another if they were to use the same Web browser. Table 13 shows the most common
User-Agent headers that were submitted to the Data Capture Web Site. Note the occurrence of
values such as “bot”, “agent”, or “spider” (these rows are highlighted).
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User-Agent Headers
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MJ12bot/v1.4.5; http://www.majestic12.co.uk/bot.php?+)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:6.0.2) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0.2
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; bingbot/2.0; +http://www.bing.com/bingbot.htm)
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/36.0.1985.143 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 8_3 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/600.1.4 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Version/8.0 Mobile/12F70 Safari/600.1.4 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1;
+http://www.google.com/bot.html)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; NetcraftSurveyAgent/1.0; +info@netcraft.com)
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/37.0.2062.120 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/32.0.1700.107 Safari/537.36
Table 13 - User-Agent Headers

Several autonomous agents saw sub-half-second resource access times. Tables 14 and 15 display
the resources accessed and their headers. Resources accessed include “robots.txt”, which is
generally a resource accessed by robots. The headers for the same records specify that the UserAgent is a robot.
IP Address
52.26.82.4
52.26.82.4
52.26.82.4
66.249.79.217
66.249.79.217
66.249.79.217
66.249.79.217
158.69.225.37
158.69.225.37
216.145.14.142
216.145.14.142

Url
Date
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/Home/About
http://www.trytologin.com/robots.txt
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/robots.txt
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/robots.txt
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/
http://www.trytologin.com/robots.txt

Table 14 - Resources Accessed by Robots

10/24/2015 7:05:17.677
10/24/2015 7:05:17.770
10/24/2015 7:05:18.113
10/31/2015 1:42:35.257
10/31/2015 1:42:35.333
11/7/2015 17:17:34.660
11/7/2015 17:17:34.767
12/21/2015 9:31:31.087
12/21/2015 9:31:31.230
12/25/2015 1:49:41.457
12/25/2015 1:49:38.847
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IP Address
52.26.82.4
52.26.82.4
52.26.82.4

Date
10/24/2015 7:05:17.677
10/24/2015 7:05:17.770
10/24/2015 7:05:18.113

66.249.79.217

10/31/2015 1:42:35.257

66.249.79.217

10/31/2015 1:42:35.333

66.249.79.217

11/7/2015 17:17:34.660

66.249.79.217

11/7/2015 17:17:34.767

158.69.225.37

12/21/2015 9:31:31.087

158.69.225.37

12/21/2015 9:31:31.230

216.145.14.142 12/25/2015 1:49:41.457

216.145.14.142 12/25/2015 1:49:38.847

User-Agent
BusinessBot: Nathan@lead-caddy.com
BusinessBot: Nathan@lead-caddy.com
BusinessBot: Nathan@lead-caddy.com
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1;
+http://www.google.com/bot.html)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1;
+http://www.google.com/bot.html)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1;
+http://www.google.com/bot.html)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1;
+http://www.google.com/bot.html)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Lipperhey-KausAustralis/5.0;
+https://www.lipperhey.com/en/about/)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Lipperhey-KausAustralis/5.0;
+https://www.lipperhey.com/en/about/)
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en;
rv:1.9.0.13) Gecko/2009073022 Firefox/3.5.2
(.NET CLR 3.5.30729) SurveyBot/2.3
(DomainTools)
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en;
rv:1.9.0.13) Gecko/2009073022 Firefox/3.5.2
(.NET CLR 3.5.30729) SurveyBot/2.3
(DomainTools)

Table 15 - Fast Resource Access Headers

These results agree with other researchers’ results and report no new results.
5.1.2 Submitted form Information
When evaluating submitted form information from several different sources, it was apparent that
wild robots did not submit the Web form. This is likely due to the robots being indexers. As a
result, these agents were not assessed for biometric information. However, scripted agents and
human agents submitted form information. One reason the form submission functionality is
excluded is in consideration of the lost time and resources when a Web Site performs input
validation.
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5.1.3 Human Agents
Human agents are often identified primarily by slower request times and by submitting particular
timing vectors. Table 16 displays timing vectors for one of the human agents that provided
information on the Web form. Negative values in the Time Pressed column indicate that the key
was pressed before the previous key was released.
Shift Pressed Time Released Time-Pressed
0
214
0
0
101
6
0
274
-79
0
374
-154
1
704
176
1
544
-208
0
561
441
0
664
-96
0
737
-87
0
175
80
0
263
-71
0
176
32
0
232
-104
0
225
104
0
64
2
0
239
40
0
278
-119
0
321
153
Table 16 - User submitted timing vector for Email Field

This agent is categorized as a human due to the variance in the timing vector. These results are
provided for comparison of robotic behavior in the following section.
5.1.4 Visual Studio Web Tests
Visual Studio Web Tests do not allow for direct interaction with the Web page; instead, it opts to
send predefined HTTP POST requests. Visual Studio tests are identified as robotic behavior by
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evaluating the inter-request time between page access, the subsequent posting of data, and the
posting of the identical information.
Successfully capturing and analyzing data has provided striking results. Request speed is already
known to be a common robot detection marker. Nevertheless, repetitive data posting might
indicate a new robot detection marker. However, to validate this new marker more research is
needed.
5.1.5 Selenium
Selenium uses a Web browser to send commands, resulting in the identification of typical browser
headers. However, it is determined that a robot is interacting with the form when the framework
is used naively due to the rapid insertion of key presses. These inter-key press times are executed
with sub-two millisecond timings, a speed that equates to superhuman typing speeds. Though
there exist longer delays, it depicts atypical human typing speeds.
Table 17 shows the keyboard dynamics profile as captured from the Selenium agent.
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Shift Pressed Time Released (ms) Time-Pressed (ms)
0
23
0
0
8
1
0
4
1
0
5
1
0
5
0
0
5
1
0
4
0
0
5
2
0
76
1
0
40
-35
0
39
34
0
6
2
0
4
1
0
5
1
0
5
2
0
6
1
Table 17 - Selenium submitted timing vector for Email Field

However, since a programming language drives Selenium, it is possible to create delays between
key presses to modify this behavior.
As suspected, this agent is easily identifiable through its speed of typing. The speed of data input
is not a well-researched topic, and this provides some validity into keystroke dynamics as a
detection marker.
5.1.6 iMacros
iMacros posts standard header information, as it uses the actual browser to perform work.
However, when inputting data into the login form, no key strokes are sent to the form. Since no
key strokes are sent to the form, it becomes apparent that this was not a user typing login
information. In this scenario, no timing vectors were captured. The submission of a form without
any common input markers is submitted on behalf of an automation tool and is an additional input
marker for detection of robots.
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5.1.7 Sahi
Sahi uses a Web browser to perform automated steps. Request headers cannot determine if a robot
is an agent performing actions, due to the agent using a Web browser. Determination of a robot
agent was completed by evaluating the submitted key press interval and hold times; these were
typically less than two milliseconds in duration.
Table 18 shows a captured timing vector from the Sahi agent. The input timing from this agent
shows rapid keypress and key release timings, faster than humans can consistently do so. The shift
pressed column shows a Boolean values (1 = true, 0 = false) if the shift key was pressed with
another key. The Time Released and Time Pressed columns show timing in milliseconds.
Shift Pressed Time Released Time-Pressed
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
Table 18 - Sahi submitted timing vector for Email Field

Similarly to the Selenium experiment, results captured here also reflect that rapid input times are
due to an automated agent entry. This further adds to the validity that rapid input timing is a
marker for robot agents.
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5.2 Timing Vector Analysis
The behavior patterns the automated agents and humans exhibit are vastly different. Often, HTTP
headers differ and display information indicative of robot presence. Other times, interaction of the
web page differs significantly. Evaluation of the form interaction patterns presents a clear
indication of the differences in input patterns. Humans, for example, exhibit varying input
patterns. Robots tend to maintain constant interaction patterns - if they are provided at all. In
addition, robot page request time is often much faster than that of human agents; as previously
shown in Table 14 - Resources Accessed by Robots.
5.2.1 Human v Human analysis
In the later sections, various algorithms including backpropagation, support vector machines,
decision tree classification, and dissimilarity comparison are evaluated.

For each of these

algorithms, the data that was used is described in the methodology.
5.2.1.1 Backpropagation
While promising in individual research applications, the length of time required by
backpropagation training prohibits its use in modern Web applications. Many researchers, who
experimented with this method to provide a biometric signature for login, utilized several different
human agents to provide negative training models in their research. Since this amount of training
is not practical in the normal iteration of training, additional measures need to be evaluated that
either extend or differ in methodology provided here. It is possible that when registering a new
user account to capture a common phrase and use lazy learning via backpropagation to train the
model using a single phrase or word. However, this method requires retraining for every individual
during account registration. This does not seem like a practical architecture to use in production
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ready systems since the training and comparison needs to compare thousands (or more) user inputs
to provide invalid login data.
Initial testing of backpropagation yielded unexpected results. While creating valid training using
six input samples, five yielded similar data input profiles as shown in Figure 6 - Key Hold Times
with Fake Login and Figure 7 - Key Press Times with Fake Login.
Even after training the network with 2000 randomly generated invalid login attempts, the
backpropagation algorithm calculated these attempts with the same certainty rate as valid login
attempts. Because of the small sample of valid logins and training with the invalid data set, there
is a high probability of accepting invalid user logins. When training the neural network without
these randomly generated login attempts, there are only minor differences in classification
certainty. These results clearly show that a more robust training system is required to identify the
biometric markers of typing patterns correctly.
The experiments performed using backpropagation were ultimately unsuccessful. Most research
on this topic supports backpropagation as a highly successful means of providing authentication.
However, the results gathered with this research suggest otherwise. Since this method requires a
substantial amount of training per potential user of the system, this method is not a good choice
for determining invalid attempts using Web forms.
5.2.1.2 Support Vector Machines
As another promising method of classifying data, utilization of support vector machines provided
successful results. With adequate random records trained as invalid logins, support vector
machines accurately determine if a user is valid based on keyboard dynamics.
Results of this training are shown in Table 19. Each test performed 10,000 attempted logins.
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Table 19 shows the results of training and classification, as well as performance metrics.

# Random Training Records
5000
1000
100
10
0

FRR
11.1%
1.3%
0.1%
0%
100%

FAR
0.0007%
0.0013%
0.0018%
0.0069%
100%

Memory
Usage*
684MB
43MB
10MB
9.7MB
9.7MB

Processing
Time*
1 Second
288 ms
82 ms
54 ms
51 ms

Table 19 - Results of Support Vector Machine Training

It is apparent that the inclusion of the invalid training records significantly increases the accuracy
of the FAR. When utilizing 1000 or more random training records, memory and processor
consumption explodes. Training with many generated logins causes performance issues if the
system is in constant high demand.
Support vector machines are touted as highly accurate methods of clustering data, and the results
above suggest that this holds true for these experiments. SVMs display accuracy, which allows
for secondary authentication using a user’s keystroke dynamics.
5.2.1.3 Decision Tree
Decision tree classification shows more promise than does backpropagation classification for this
data. Since only a few inputs that classify as valid logins exist, using randomly generated invalid
values contribute to a very high degree of accuracy towards classifying invalid logins.
When using the 6 known login attempts for the user input that was captured and one invalid attempt
to train, the false acceptance rate (FAR) is consistently between 55 and 120 attempts per 10,000
attempts (.55% to 1.12% false acceptance, with an average of .7977%) when using 10,000
generated login attempts to test the model against. The false rejection rate (FRR) for this model
yielded no errors in the number of falsely rejected attempts when using zero generated login
attempts; these attempts include the initial valid model and an additional attempted login.
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As stated in the methodology, attempts to decrease the false acceptance rate used additional invalid
login training. While the decrease in false acceptance when trained with more invalid logins, the
increase in false rejection rates may designate the need for true training rather than generated
training.
FAR and FRR values for all tests are shown in Table 20. These values are per 10,000 generated
logins. Max and min values are calculated from repeating testing iterations 1000 times.
Generated
Invalid Login False
Count
Min
0
10
100
1000
5000

Acceptance False
Max
55
0
19
0
0

Acceptance
110
121
134
82
32

False
Acceptance False
Average
Rejections
79.77
0
60.681
418
79.708
535
27.736
826
6.079
775

Table 20 - Decision Tree Results (values are per 10,000)

While it is apparent that the false acceptance rate is reduced once significant training is undertaken,
the number of false rejections increases for most iterations.
This experiment was unsuccessful at classifying valid authentications using keyboard dynamics.
This is due to the high false rejection rate seen when using more invalid training data.
5.2.1.4 Dissimilarity Comparison
Using the test data with this method produced promising results. Utilizing only six samples to
train the model, this method has given an FAR of < 0.04% when tested against a known invalid
login, and 1000000 generated login attempts with a sigma of 3.0 (explained in the methodology).
This equates to less than 400 invalid login attempts per million.
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This method is a highly accurate means of keystroke dynamics classification. To further test the
accuracy of this algorithm, another known login attempt was added to the training set. This login
attempt pattern differed significantly from the intial training set. A new master trajectory profile
was created which accommodated the addition. Tests were then executed against a valid and
invalid login attempt. With the initial sigma value of three, the dissimilarity comparison method
lends itself to be more accepting of invalid attempts. The initial sigma of three classified the
invalid attempt as valid. By reducing the sigma value to one, the known invalid login attempt was
classified as invalid and the valid login attempt was classified as valid. The same test of comparing
one million generated records against the verification algorithm using this model was executed
and resulted in a significant reduction in accepted logins – an FAR of < .03% was consistently
reported.
Once, the outlier record was removed from the training set and the sigma was set to one, in an
attempt to reduce FAR. Valid and invalid tests were classified accurately. When compared with
the one million randomly generated attempts, none of these attempts were successful. This result
was unexpected and the test was performed one hundred additional times. The results conclude
with an FAR of 3/100,000,000 or .000003%. All valid samples and the additional login attempt
were classified as valid. However, by reducing the sigma value to 1, there are potential increases
in false rejection rates.
As with SVM results, this method also successfully identifies keystroke dynamics by pattern
analysis.
accurately.

This method does not require training against invalid login attempts to classify
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5.3 Summary
It is feasible to identify robot agents and human actors with a high degree of accuracy using
interaction patterns of a Web application. However, many of the behavioral patterns exhibited by
robots are programmable to act like humans. Clever programming can mimic humans by slowing
interactions, prioritizing click paths, changing the rate that input commands are sent, and making
requests from known web browsers. Humans are also uniquely identifiable by their biometric
signatures while interacting with Web pages.
Many Web robots self-identify using HTTP headers. Most of the robots whose data were captured
via the Web application were typically found doing one of the following:


Submitting an HTTP Agent header that identifies as a bot



Accessing robots.txt



Having fast request times impossible for a human user



Performing abnormal click paths



Accessing hidden resources



Having exceptionally fast keystrokes

Early identification and session termination can reduce network and processor load of the Web
server. This reduces the risk of DDoS attacks. By distinguishing robots with malicious intent,
additional security risks are mitigated by disallowing these agents to attempt to login to the system.
In the event of humans logging into a Web application, it is viable to utilize layers of security to
the login process. It has been shown that even with small amounts of valid training data, accurate
identification models identify a particular user based on keystroke dynamic biometric signatures.
Many researchers suggest the implementing neural networks to identify users; however, without
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significant training of each user model, the applicability of neural networks and backpropagation
is not feasible at this time. A superior set of choices is found in using support vector machines or
through dissimilarity comparison, which had false acceptance rates of less than .01 percent of the
randomly generated login attempts, and false rejection rates, which do not inhibit the user through
most use cases.
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE WORK
While the use of keystroke dynamics to identify human agents is beneficial for security purposes,
the behavioral changes humans exhibit over time may cause inaccuracies in long-term model
generation. Temporal analysis of these behavioral changes is needed to bring keystroke dynamics
to worldwide use. Models with higher accuracy may be developed by identifying a subset of valid
records that best fits behavioral patterns demonstrated by a particular human.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
By evaluating the various information that a Web agent provides to a Web server, a promising
assortment of performance and security optimizations can be implemented.

Differentiating

humans from Web robots and limiting the robot’s resources will significantly reduce bandwidth
consumption. Lastly, coupling of the capture of biometric information with its subsequent analysis
increases security quite dramatically.
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APPENDICES
A Dissimilarity Algorithm
Code

1

-

Validate

by

bool function verificationPattern (
double[][] knownInputs,
double[] inputToValidate,
double sigma)
{
var masterProfile = CreateMasterProfile(knownInputs);
var dissimilarityProfile = CreateDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, masterProfile);
var inputToValidateDissimilarity = CalculateDissimilarity(masterProfile, inputToValidate);
return inputToValidateDissimilarity <
(dissimilarityProfile.Average() + (sigma*dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation()));
}
double[] function CreateMasterProfile(knownInputs)
{
var masterProfile = new double[];
for (var i = 0; i < length; i++)
{
for (var j = 0; j < knownInputCount; j++)
{
masterProfile[i] += knownInputs[j][i]/knownInputs.Count();
}
}
}
return masterProfile;
}
double function CalculateDissimilarity(
double[] masterProfile,
double[] inputToValidate)
{
var dissimilarity = 0d;
for (var j = 0; j < lengthOfInput; j+=2)
{
dissimilarity += distance(
masterProfile[j], //x1
inputToValidate[j], //x2
masterProfile[j+1], //y1
inputToValidate[j+1] //y2
)
}
return dissimilarity;
}

Dissimilarity
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double[] CreateDissimilarityProfile(
double[][] knownInputs,
double[] masterProfile)
{
var knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage = new double[lengthOfInput/2];
for (var i = 0; i < lengthOfInput; i+=2)
{
var dissimilarityLocal = 0d;
for (var j = 0; j < knownInputs.Length; j++)
{
knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage[i/2] += distance(
masterProfile[i], //x1
knownInputs[j][i], //x2
masterProfile[i+1], //y1
knownInputs[j][i + 1]//y2
)
}
}
return knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage;
}
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B Data Capture Layout Template Markup
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta name="description" content="Try To Login A Social Experiment. A human vs robot
detection application. My graduate thesis research web page."/>
<meta name="keywords" content="Try, To, Login, Try To Login, trytologin, trytologin.com, bot, robot, webbot, human, detect, detection, identify, identification"/>
<meta name="author" content="Ben Cooley"/>
<meta name="language" content="English"/>
<meta charset="utf-8"/>
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0"/>
<title>Try To Login.com</title>
@Styles.Render("~/Content/css")
@Scripts.Render("~/bundles/modernizr")
</head>
<body>
<div class="navbar navbar-inverse navbar-fixed-top">
<div class="container">
<div class="navbar-header">
<button type="button"
class="navbar-toggle"
Data-toggle="collapse"
Data-target=".navbar-collapse">
<span class="icon-bar"></span>
<span class="icon-bar"></span>
<span class="icon-bar"></span>
</button>
@Html.ActionLink("Try To Login",
"Index",
"Home",
new { area = "" },
new { @class = "navbar-brand" })
</div>
<div class="navbar-collapse collapse">
<ul class="nav navbar-nav">
<li>@Html.ActionLink("Login", "Index", "Home")</li>
<li>@Html.ActionLink("About", "About", "Home")</li>
<li>@Html.ActionLink("Contact", "Contact", "Home")</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="container body-content">
@RenderBody()
<hr/>
<footer>
<p>&copy; @DateTime.Now.Year - TryToLogin.com</p>
</footer>
</div>
@Scripts.Render("~/bundles/jquery")
@Scripts.Render("~/bundles/bootstrap")
@RenderSection("scripts", false)
</body>
</html>
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C Login Page Markup
@model Thesis.Models.LoginViewModel
@{
ViewBag.Title = "Try To Log in";
}
<h1>@ViewBag.Title.</h1>
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-8">
<section id="loginForm">
@using (Html.BeginForm("Index",
"Home",
new { ViewBag.ReturnUrl },
FormMethod.Post,
new
{
@class = "form-horizontal",
role = "form"
}))
{
@Html.AntiForgeryToken()
<h4>Try to log in.</h4>
<hr/>
@Html.ValidationSummary(false, "", new { @class = "text-danger" })
<div class="form-group">
@Html.LabelFor(m => m.Email, new { @class = "col-md-2 control-label" })
<div class="col-md-10">
@Html.TextBoxFor(m => m.Email, new
{
@class = "form-control",
v_on = "click: addClick, keydown: addKeyDown, keyup: addKeyUp"
})
@Html.ValidationMessageFor(m => m.Email,
"",
new { @class = "text-danger" })
</div>
</div>
<div class="form-group">
@Html.LabelFor(m => m.Password, new { @class = "col-md-2 control-label" })
<div class="col-md-10">
@Html.PasswordFor(m => m.Password, new
{
@class = "form-control",
v_on = "click: addClick, keydown: addKeyDown, keyup: addKeyUp"
})
@Html.ValidationMessageFor(m => m.Password, "", new
{
@class = "text-danger"
})
</div>
</div>
<div class="form-group">
<div class="col-md-10 col-md-offset-2">
<input class="btn btn-default"
name="submit"
type="submit"
value="Log in"
v-on="click: addClick, keydown: addKeyDown, keyup: addKeyUp"/>
</div>
</div>

65
<div class="hidden"
v-repeat="request.formInteraction.keyboardInteractions">
<input class="form-control"
name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].KeyPressed"
type="hidden"
value="{{keyPressed}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].AltPressed"
type="hidden"
value="{{altPressed || 'false'}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].CtrlPressed"
type="hidden"
value="{{ctrlPressed || 'false'}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].ShiftPressed"
type="hidden"
value="{{shiftPressed || 'false'}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].TimePressed"
type="hidden"
value="{{timePressed}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].TimeReleased"
type="hidden"
value="{{timeReleased}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].ElementName"
type="hidden"
value="{{elementName}}"/>
</div>
<div class="hidden"
v-repeat="request.formInteraction.mouseInteractions">
<input class="form-control"
name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].MouseX"
type="hidden"
value="{{mouseX}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].MouseY"
type="hidden"
value="{{mouseY}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].Button"
type="hidden"
value="{{button}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].TimePressed"
type="hidden"
value="{{timePressed}}"/>
<input class="form-control"
name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].ElementName"
type="hidden"
value="{{elementName}}"/>
</div>
}
</section>
</div>
</div>
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@section Scripts {
@Scripts.Render("~/bundles/jqueryval")
@Scripts.Render("~/bundles/ui")
}
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D Non-Intrusive Data Capturing JavaScript

$(function () {
var ui = new Vue({
el: "#loginForm",
data: function () {
return {
request: {
formInteraction: {
keyboardInteractions: [],
mouseInteractions: []
}
},
keysPressed: {},
startTime: undefined,
keysDown: []
};
},
methods: {
addClick: function (e) {
var interaction = {
mouseX: parseInt(e.clientX || e.x),
mouseY: parseInt(e.clientY || e.y),
button: e.button,
timePressed: new Date().toISOString(),
elementName: e.target.name
};
this.request.formInteraction.mouseInteractions.push(interaction);
},
addKeyDown: function (e) {
if (!this.keysPressed[e.keyCode]) {
var time = new Date();
this.startTime = this.startTime || time.getTime();
var interaction = {
altPressed: e.altKey,
ctrlPressed: e.ctrlKey,
shiftPressed: e.shiftKey,
keyPressed: e.keyCode,
time: time,
timeReleased: "",
elementName: e.target.name
};
this.keysPressed[e.keyCode] = interaction;
interaction.timePressed = this.keysDown.length ?
-1 * (time.getTime() - this.keysDown[0].time.getTime()) :
time.getTime() - this.startTime;
this.keysDown.push(interaction);
this.request.formInteraction.keyboardInteractions.push(interaction);
}
},
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addKeyUp: function (e) {
var pressedKey = this.keysPressed[e.keyCode];
if (pressedKey) {
var time = new Date();
pressedKey.timeReleased = time.getTime() - this.startTime;
var index = this.keysDown.indexOf(pressedKey);
index > -1 && this.keysDown.splice(index, 1);
this.keysDown.length || (this.startTime = time.getTime());
delete this.keysPressed[e.keyCode];
}
}
}
});
}
);
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E Interaction Form Controller
using
using
using
using
using
using
using
using
using
using
using

System.Collections.Generic;
System.Linq;
System.Threading.Tasks;
System.Web;
System.Web.Mvc;
Microsoft.AspNet.Identity.Owin;
Thesis.Data;
Thesis.Data.FormIInteraction;
Thesis.Data.Request;
Thesis.Models;
Thesis.Models.Services;

namespace Thesis.Controllers
{
public class HomeController : Controller
{
private readonly IApplicationDbContext _db;
private ApplicationSignInManager _signInManager;
public HomeController(IApplicationDbContext db)
{
_db = db;
}
public ApplicationSignInManager SignInManager
=>
_signInManager ??
(_signInManager =
HttpContext.GetOwinContext().Get<ApplicationSignInManager>())
;
public async Task<ActionResult> Index()
{
var request = CreateRequestObject(new LoginViewModel(),
RequestType.Get);
_db.Requests.Add(request);
await _db.SaveChangesAsync();
return View();
}
public async Task<ActionResult> About()
{
ViewBag.Message = "For a graduate degree thesis";
var request = CreateRequestObject(new LoginViewModel(),
RequestType.Get);
_db.Requests.Add(request);
await _db.SaveChangesAsync();
return View();
}
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[ActionName("Index")]
[HttpPost]
[AllowAnonymous]
[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
public async Task<ActionResult> Login(
LoginViewModel model,
string returnUrl)
{
var request = CreateRequestObject(model);
request.SignInStatus = SignInStatus.Failure;
if (!ModelState.IsValid)
{
return View("Index");
}
var result =
await
SignInManager.PasswordSignInAsync(model.Email,
model.Password,
model.RememberMe,
false);
request.SignInStatus = result;
_db.Requests.Add(request);
await _db.SaveChangesAsync();
switch (result)
{
case SignInStatus.Success:
return View("Success");
default:
ModelState.AddModelError("", "Invalid login attempt.");
return View("Index");
}
}
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private ApplicationRequestContext CreateRequestObject(
LoginViewModel model,
RequestType requestType = RequestType.Post)
{
var request = new ApplicationRequestContext
{
Headers = new List<ApplicationRequestHeader>(),
Form =
requestType == RequestType.Post
? new List<ApplicationRequestForm>()
: null
};
if (requestType == RequestType.Post)
{
foreach (
var key in
Request.Form.AllKeys.Where(
key =>
!key.ToLower().Contains("keyboardinteraction") &&
!key.ToLower().Contains("mouseinteraction")))
{
request.Form.Add(new ApplicationRequestForm
{
Name = key,
Value = Request.Form[key]
});
}
request.FormInteraction = new FormInteraction
{
KeyboardInteractions =
(model.KeyboardInteraction ??
new KeyboardInteraction[] { }).ToList(),
MouseInteractions =
(model.MouseInteraction ?? new MouseInteraction[] { })
.ToList()
};
}
foreach (var key in Request.Headers.AllKeys)
{
request.Headers.Add(new ApplicationRequestHeader
{
Name = key,
Value = Request.Headers[key]
});
}
request.IpAddress = Request.UserHostAddress;
if (Request.UrlReferrer != null)
request.Referrer = Request.UrlReferrer.AbsoluteUri;
request.RequestType = requestType;
if (Request.Url != null) request.Url = Request.Url.AbsoluteUri;
return request;
}
}
}
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F Object Model Entities
using System;
using System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations;
using System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations.Schema;
namespace Thesis.Data
{
public class IdentityModel
{
public IdentityModel()
{
DateCreated = DateTime.UtcNow;
}
[Key]
public int Id { get; set; }
public DateTime? DateCreated { get; set; }
}
}
namespace Thesis.Data.Request
{
public enum RequestType
{
Get = 0,
Post = 1
}
public class DictionaryEntity : IdentityModel
{
public string Name { get; set; }
public string Value { get; set; }
}
[Table("RequestHeaders")]
public class ApplicationRequestHeader : DictionaryEntity
{
}
[Table("FormInfo")]
public class ApplicationRequestForm : DictionaryEntity
{
}
}
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using
using
using
using

System.Data.Entity;
Microsoft.AspNet.Identity.EntityFramework;
Thesis.Data.Authentication;
Thesis.Data.Request;

namespace Thesis.Data
{
public class ApplicationDbContext : IdentityDbContext<ApplicationUser>,
IApplicationDbContext
{
public ApplicationDbContext()
: base("DefaultConnection", false)
{
}
public DbSet<ApplicationRequestContext> Requests { get; set; }
public static ApplicationDbContext Create()
{
return new ApplicationDbContext();
}
}
}

using
using
using
using

System;
System.Collections.Generic;
Microsoft.AspNet.Identity.Owin;
Thesis.Data.FormIInteraction;

namespace Thesis.Data.Request
{
public class ApplicationRequestContext : IdentityModel
{
public ApplicationRequestContext()
{
Saved = DateTime.UtcNow;
}
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
}
}

DateTime Saved { get; set; }
string IpAddress { get; set; }
string Referrer { get; set; }
virtual ICollection<ApplicationRequestHeader> Headers { get; set; }
virtual ICollection<ApplicationRequestForm> Form { get; set; }
string Url { get; set; }
RequestType RequestType { get; set; }
virtual FormInteraction FormInteraction { get; set; }
SignInStatus SignInStatus { get; set; }
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using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations;
namespace Thesis.Data.FormIInteraction
{
public enum MouseButton
{
Left = 0,
Middle = 1,
Right = 2
}
public class FormInteraction : IdentityModel
{
public ICollection<KeyboardInteraction> KeyboardInteractions { get; set; }
public ICollection<MouseInteraction> MouseInteractions { get; set; }
}
public class MouseInteraction : IdentityModel
{
[Required]
public DateTime? TimePressed { get; set; }
[Required]
public int? MouseX { get; set; }
[Required]
public int? MouseY { get; set; }
[Required]
public MouseButton? Button { get; set; }
[StringLength(10), Required]
public string ElementName { get; set; }
}
public class KeyboardInteraction : IdentityModel
{
[Required]
public decimal? TimePressed { get; set; }
public decimal? TimeReleased { get; set; }
[Required]
public int? KeyPressed { get; set; }
[StringLength(10), Required]
public string ElementName { get; set; }
public bool AltPressed { get; set; }
public bool CtrlPressed { get; set; }
public bool ShiftPressed { get; set; }
}
}
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G Backpropagation Classifier
using System;
using AForge.Neuro;
using AForge.Neuro.Learning;
namespace Thesis.Data.Classifiers
{
public class Backpropagation
{
public ActivationNetwork Network { get; }
public BackPropagationLearning Teacher { get; }
public Backpropagation()
{
Network = new ActivationNetwork(new BipolarSigmoidFunction(1), 10, 10, 1);
Teacher = new BackPropagationLearning(Network);
}
public string[] BackPropogationTrain(double[][] inputData, double[][] outputData, int
iterations)
{
bool needStopping = false;
int iterateCount = 0;
double error = 0;
string[] results = new string[2];
double[][] input = inputData;
double[][] output = outputData;
Teacher.LearningRate = .1d;
while (!needStopping)
{
error = Teacher.RunEpoch(input, output);
if (error == 0)
{
break;
}
else if (Math.Round(error, 2) == 0)
{
break;
}
else if (iterateCount < iterations)
{
iterateCount++;
}
else
{
needStopping = true;
}
iterateCount++;
}
results[0] = error.ToString();
results[1] = iterateCount.ToString();
return results;
}
}
}
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H Support Vector Machine Classifier
using
using
using
using

System.Collections.Generic;
Accord.MachineLearning.VectorMachines;
Accord.MachineLearning.VectorMachines.Learning;
Accord.Statistics.Kernels;

namespace Thesis.Data.Classifiers
{
public class KernelSupportVectorMachines
{
private readonly KernelSupportVectorMachine _ksvm;
public KernelSupportVectorMachines()
{
_ksvm = new KernelSupportVectorMachine(new Gaussian(100), 10);
}
public double Train(double[][] inputs, int[] outputs)
{
for (var i = 0; i < outputs.Length; i++)
{
outputs[i] = outputs[i] >= 1 ? 1 : -1;
}
var smo = new SequentialMinimalOptimization(_ksvm, inputs, outputs)
{
UseComplexityHeuristic = true
};
return smo.Run(true);
}
public IEnumerable<double> Classify(double[][] inputs)
{
foreach (var input in inputs)
{
yield return _ksvm.Compute(input);
}
}
}
}
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I Decision Tree Classifier
using
using
using
using
using

System.Collections.Generic;
Accord.MachineLearning.DecisionTrees;
Accord.MachineLearning.DecisionTrees.Learning;
Accord.Math;
AForge;

namespace Thesis.Data.Classifiers
{
public class DecisionTreeClassifier
{
public DecisionTreeClassifier()
{
Tree = new DecisionTree(new List<DecisionVariable>(
new[]
{
DecisionVariable.Continuous("0", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("1", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("2", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("3", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("4", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("5", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("6", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("7", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("8", new DoubleRange(-10000,
DecisionVariable.Continuous("9", new DoubleRange(-10000,
}), 2);
Teacher = new C45Learning(Tree);
}
C45Learning Teacher { get; }
public DecisionTree Tree { get; }
public double Train(double[][] inputs, int[] outputs)
{
// The C4.5 algorithm expects the class labels to
// range from 0 to k, so we convert -1 to be zero:
outputs = outputs.Apply(x => x = (x <= 0 ? 0 : 1));
var error = Teacher.Run(inputs, outputs);
return error;
}
public IEnumerable<int> Classify(double[][] inputs)
{
return inputs.Apply(x => Tree.Compute(x));
}
}
}

10000)),
10000)),
10000)),
10000)),
10000)),
10000)),
10000)),
10000)),
10000)),
10000))
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J Dissimilarity Comparison Classifier
using
using
using
using

System;
System.Collections.Generic;
System.Linq;
Accord.Statistics;

namespace Thesis.Data.Classifiers
{
public static class DissimilarityComparison
{
public static bool AuthenticateUser(
double[][] knownInputs,
double[] profileToValidate,
double sigma)
{
var length = knownInputs[0].Count();
if (knownInputs.Any(profile => length != profile.Count()))
{
throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(knownInputs));
}
if (profileToValidate.Count() != length)
return false;
var masterTrajectoryProfile =
CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(knownInputs, length);
var dissimilarityProfile =
GetDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs,
masterTrajectoryProfile,
length);
var knownAverageDissimilarity = dissimilarityProfile.Average();
var knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity =
dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation();
return IsProfileValid(
masterTrajectoryProfile,
profileToValidate,
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma);
}
public static bool IsProfileValid(
double[] masterTrajectoryProfile,
double[] profileToValidate,
double knownAverageDissimilarity,
double knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
double sigma)
{
var profileToCheckDissimilarity =
GetDissimilarity(masterTrajectoryProfile, profileToValidate);
return profileToCheckDissimilarity <
knownAverageDissimilarity +
sigma*knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity;
}
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public static double[] GetDissimilarityProfile(
double[][] knownInputs,
IReadOnlyList<double> masterTrajectoryProfile,
int length)
{
var knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage = new double[length/2];
for (var i = 0; i < length; i += 2)
{
foreach (var input in knownInputs)
{
knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage[i/2] += Math.Sqrt(
Math.Pow(masterTrajectoryProfile[i] - input[i], 2) +
Math.Pow(masterTrajectoryProfile[i + 1] - input[i + 1],
2)
);
}
}
return knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage;
}
private static double GetDissimilarity(
IReadOnlyList<double> masterTrajectoryProfile,
double[] localInput)
{
var dissimilarityLocal = 0d;
var length = localInput.Count();
for (var j = 0; j < length; j += 2)
{
dissimilarityLocal +=
Math.Sqrt(
Math.Pow(masterTrajectoryProfile[j] - localInput[j], 2) +
Math.Pow(
masterTrajectoryProfile[j + 1] - localInput[j + 1],
2));
}
return dissimilarityLocal;
}
public static double[] CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(
double[][] knownInputs,
int length)
{
var masterTrajectoryProfile = new double[length];
var knownInputCount = knownInputs.Count();
for (var i = 0; i < length; i++)
{
var sum = 0d;
for (var j = 0; j < knownInputCount; j++)
{
sum += knownInputs[j][i];
}
masterTrajectoryProfile[i] = sum/knownInputCount;
}
return masterTrajectoryProfile;
}}}
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K Common Experiment Variables and Functions
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications
{
public static class Constants
{
public static readonly double[]
192d, 88d };
public static readonly double[]
168d, 96d };
public static readonly double[]
193d, 89d };
public static readonly double[]
183d, 64d };
public static readonly double[]
187d, 88d };
public static readonly double[]
192d, 88d };

One = { 112d, 0d, 144d, -32d, 408d, 312d, 144d, 40d,
Two = { 96d, 0d, 184d, 87d, 456d, 376d, 152d, 56d,
Three = { 152d, 0d, 191d, -87d, 393d, 304d, 143d, 40d,
Four = { 87d, 0d, 337d, 225d, 353d, 272d, 151d, 46d,
Five = { 121d, 0d, 144d, 32d, 311d, 231d, 153d, 48d,
Six = { 112d, 0d, 144d, -32d, 408d, 312d, 144d, 40d,

public static readonly double[] Fake = { 112d, 0d, 168d, -48d, 104d, 24d, 168d, 55d,
136d, 56d };
public static readonly double[] Real = { 152.00d, 0.00d, 184.00d, -72.00d, 368.00d,
296.00d, 152.00d, 49.00d, 137.00d, 41.00d };
public static readonly double[] No = { 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d };
public static double[][] Inputs()
{
return new[]
{
One,
Two,
Three,
Four,
Five,
Six,
Fake
};
}
public static double[][] InputsNoFake()
{
return new[]
{
One,
Two,
Three,
Four,
Five,
Six
};
}
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public static double[][] GoodInputs()
{
return new[]
{
One,
Two,
Three,
Five,
Six
};
}
public static double[][] OutputsDouble()
{
var output =
new List<double[]>(new[]
{
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 0 }
});
return output.ToArray();
}
public static double[][] OutputsDoubleNoFake()
{
var output =
new List<double[]>(new[]
{
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 }
});
return output.ToArray();
}
public static double[][] GoodOutputs()
{
var output =
new List<double[]>(new[]
{
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 }
});
return output.ToArray();
}
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public static int[] GoodOutputsInt()
{
return new[] { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 };
}
public static int[] OutputsInt()
{
return new[] { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 };
}
public static int[] OutputsIntNoFake()
{
return new[] { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 };
}
public static double[][] GenerateBadData(int cells, int rows, double max)
{
var random = new Random();
return
Enumerable.Range(0, rows)
.Select(
x =>
Enumerable.Range(0, cells)
.Select(
y =>
(y == 1) ? 0 :
(y % 2 == 1
? (random.NextDouble() > .5d
? -1
: 1)
: 1) *
random.NextDouble() * max)
.ToArray())
.ToArray();
}
public static int[][] GenerateBadData(int cells, int rows, int max)
{
var random = new Random();
return
Enumerable.Range(0, rows)
.Select(
x =>
Enumerable.Range(0, cells)
.Select(
y =>
(y == 1) ? 0 :
(y % 2 == 1
? (random.NextDouble() > .5d
? -1
: 1)
: 1) *
random.Next(max))
.ToArray())
.ToArray();
}
}
}
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L Backpropagation Test
using
using
using
using

System.Collections.Generic;
System.Linq;
Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting;
Thesis.Data.Classifiers;

namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications
{
[TestClass]
public class BackPropagationClassifiers
{
[TestMethod]
public void CanTrain()
{
var p = new Backpropagation();
var arr = new List<double[]>
{
Constants.One,
Constants.Two,
Constants.Three,
Constants.Four,
Constants.Five,
Constants.Six,
Constants.Fake,
Constants.Real
};
arr.AddRange(Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 1000, 500d));
var output =
new List<double[]>(new[]
{
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 1 },
new double[] { 0 },
new double[] { 1 }
});
Enumerable.Range(0, 1000).ToList()
.ForEach(x => output.Add(new double[] { 0 }));
p.BackPropogationTrain(arr.ToArray(), output.ToArray(), 1000);
var check1 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.One)[0];
var check2 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Two)[0];
var check3 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Three)[0];
var check4 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Four)[0];
var check5 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Five)[0];
var check6 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Six)[0];
var realCheck = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Real)[0];
var fakeCheck = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Fake)[0];
var noCheck = p.Network.Compute(Constants.No)[0];
}
}
}

84
M Support Vector Machine Tests
using
using
using
using
using

System;
System.Collections.Generic;
System.Linq;
Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting;
Thesis.Data.Classifiers;

namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications
{
[TestClass]
public class SupportVectorMachineTest
{
private readonly KernelSupportVectorMachines _svm;
private int _falseRejections;
private int _max;
private int _min;
private readonly List<int> _numberOfFalseAcceptances;
public SupportVectorMachineTest()
{
_svm = new KernelSupportVectorMachines();
_numberOfFalseAcceptances = new List<int>();
}
public TestContext TestContext { get; set; }
private void CanTrain(int numberOfRandoms = 0, int iterations = 1000)
{
for (var i = 0; i < iterations; i++)
{
Train(numberOfRandoms);
}
TestContext.WriteLine(
"{0} - {1}.False Rejections: {2}. Avg False Acceptance: {3}. Total FAs: {4}",
_min,
_max,
_falseRejections,
_numberOfFalseAcceptances.Average(),
_numberOfFalseAcceptances.Sum());
}
public void Train(int numberOfRandoms = 0)
{
var p = _svm;
var inputs = Constants.Inputs().ToList();
var randoms = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, numberOfRandoms, 500);
var outputs = Constants.OutputsInt().ToList();
outputs.AddRange(randoms.Select(x => 0));
var toClassify = new List<double[]>
{
Constants.Real,
Constants.Fake,
Constants.No
};
toClassify.AddRange(inputs);
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inputs.AddRange(randoms.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray()));
var err = p.Train(inputs.ToArray(), outputs.ToArray());
var falseGen = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 10000, 500)
.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray());
var errors = p.Classify(falseGen.ToArray()).ToList();
var errors2 = p.Classify(toClassify.ToArray()).ToList();
var errCount = errors.Count(x => x >= 0);
_max = Math.Max(_max, errCount);
_min = Math.Min(_min, errCount);
_numberOfFalseAcceptances.Add(errCount);
var falseRejections = errors2.Count(x => x >= 0);
if (falseRejections != 7)
{
_falseRejections++;
}
}
[TestMethod]
public void CanTrainNoRandoms()
{
CanTrain(0);
}
[TestMethod]
public void CanTrain10Randoms()
{
CanTrain(10);
}
[TestMethod]
public void CanTrain100Randoms()
{
CanTrain(100);
}
[TestMethod]
public void CanTrain1000Randoms()
{
CanTrain(1000);
}
[TestMethod]
public void CanTrain5000Randoms()
{
CanTrain(5000);
}
}
}
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N Decision Tree Tests
using
using
using
using
using

System;
System.Collections.Generic;
System.Linq;
Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting;
Thesis.Data.Classifiers;

namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications
{
[TestClass]
public class DecisionTreeTest
{
private readonly List<int> _numberOfFalseAcceptances;
private int _falseRejections;
private int totalComparisons;
private int _max;
private int _min = int.MaxValue;
public DecisionTreeTest()
{
_numberOfFalseAcceptances = new List<int>();
}
public TestContext TestContext { get; set; }
[TestMethod]
public void CanTrain()
{
var p = new DecisionTreeClassifier();
var inputs = Constants.Inputs();
var outputs = Constants.OutputsInt();
var toClassify = new List<double[]>
{
Constants.Real,
Constants.Fake,
Constants.No
};
toClassify.AddRange(inputs);
p.Train(inputs, outputs);
p.Classify(toClassify.ToArray());
}
[TestMethod]
public void CanClassify()
{
var p = new DecisionTreeClassifier();
var inputs = Constants.Inputs().ToList();
var randoms = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 10, 500);
inputs.AddRange(
randoms.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray()));
var outputs = Constants.OutputsInt().ToList();
outputs.AddRange(randoms.Select(x => 0));
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p.Train(inputs.ToArray(), outputs.ToArray());
var falseGen =
Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 10000, 500)
.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray());
p.Classify(falseGen.ToArray());
}
[TestMethod]
public void CanClassifyWithRandoms(int numberOfRandoms)
{
var p = new DecisionTreeClassifier();
var inputs = Constants.Inputs().ToList();
var randoms = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, numberOfRandoms, 500);
var outputs = Constants.OutputsInt().ToList();
outputs.AddRange(randoms.Select(x => 0));
var toClassify = new List<double[]>
{
Constants.Real,
Constants.Fake,
Constants.No
};
toClassify.AddRange(inputs);
inputs.AddRange(
randoms.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray()));
p.Train(inputs.ToArray(), outputs.ToArray());
var falseGen =
Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 10000, 500)
.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray());
var errors = p.Classify(falseGen.ToArray());
var errors2 = p.Classify(toClassify.ToArray());
var errCount = errors.Count(x => x == 1);
_max = Math.Max(_max, errCount);
_min = Math.Min(_min, errCount);
_numberOfFalseAcceptances.Add(errCount);
totalComparisons += falseGen.Count() + inputs.Count();
var falseRejections = errors2.Count(x => x == 1);
if (falseRejections != 7)
{
_falseRejections++;
}
}
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private void LoopGeneratedTests(int iterations, int numberOfRandoms)
{
for (var i = 0; i < iterations; i++)
{
CanClassifyWithRandoms(numberOfRandoms);
}
TestContext.WriteLine(
"{0} - {1} of {5}. False Rejections: {2}. Avg False Acceptance: {3}.
False Acceptances: {4}",
_min,
_max,
_falseRejections,
_numberOfFalseAcceptances.Average(),
_numberOfFalseAcceptances.Sum(),
totalComparisons);
}
[TestMethod]
public void LoopGeneratedTestsNoRandoms()
{
LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 0);
}
[TestMethod]
public void LoopGeneratedTests10Randoms()
{
LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 10);
}
[TestMethod]
public void LoopGeneratedTests100Randoms()
{
LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 100);
}
[TestMethod]
public void LoopGeneratedTests1000Randoms()
{
LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 1000);
}
[TestMethod]
public void LoopGeneratedTests5000Randoms()
{
LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 5000);
}
}
}
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O Dissimilarity Comparison Tests
using
using
using
using
using
using

System;
System.Linq;
Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting;
Thesis.Data.Classifiers;
Accord.Statistics;
Thesis.Data.ReadFiles;

namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications
{
[TestClass]
public class DissimilarityTest
{
int _numberOfFalseAcceptances;
int _numberOfFalseRejections;
public TestContext TestContext { get; set; }
[TestMethod]
public void CanDetermineDissimilarity()
{
var fake =
DissimilarityComparison.AuthenticateUser(Constants.InputsNoFake(), Constants.Fake, 1d);
var real =
DissimilarityComparison.AuthenticateUser(Constants.InputsNoFake(), Constants.Real, 1d);
var no =
DissimilarityComparison.AuthenticateUser(Constants.InputsNoFake(), Constants.No, 1d);
Assert.IsTrue(real);
Assert.IsFalse(fake);
Assert.IsFalse(no);
}
[TestMethod]
public void DissimilarityForRandoms()
{
var numberOfProfiles = 1000000;
var knownInputs = Constants.GoodInputs();
var length = knownInputs[0].Count();
var masterTrajectoryProfile =
DissimilarityComparison.CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(knownInputs, length);
var dissimilarityProfile =
DissimilarityComparison.GetDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, masterTrajectoryProfile,
length);
var sigma = 1d;
var knownAverageDissimilarity = dissimilarityProfile.Average();
var knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity =
dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation();
foreach (var known in knownInputs)
{
Assert.IsTrue(DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid(
masterTrajectoryProfile,
known,
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma));
}
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Assert.IsTrue(
DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid(
masterTrajectoryProfile,
Constants.Real,
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma));
Assert.IsFalse(
DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid(
masterTrajectoryProfile,
Constants.Fake,
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma));
Assert.IsFalse(
DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid(
masterTrajectoryProfile,
Constants.No,
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma));
RunAgainstInputs(masterTrajectoryProfile,
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma,
numberOfProfiles);
TestContext.WriteLine("False Acceptances: {0}. FAR: {1}%",
_numberOfFalseAcceptances,
((_numberOfFalseAcceptances / (double)numberOfProfiles) * 100));
}
private void RunAgainstInputs(
double[] masterTrajectoryProfile,
double knownAverageDissimilarity,
double knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
double sigma,
int numberOfProfiles)
{
var dataToTest = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, numberOfProfiles, 250d);
var datas = dataToTest.Take(10).Select(x => string.Join(", ", x.Select(y =>
(y/1).ToString())));
for (var i = 0; i < numberOfProfiles; i++)
{
if (
DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid(
masterTrajectoryProfile,
dataToTest[i],
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma)
)
{
_numberOfFalseAcceptances++;
}
}
}
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[TestMethod]
public void DissimilarityForRandomsLoop()
{
var numberOfProfiles = 1000000;
var knownInputs = Constants.GoodInputs();
var length = knownInputs[0].Count();
var masterTrajectoryProfile =
DissimilarityComparison.CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(knownInputs, length);
var dissimilarityProfile =
DissimilarityComparison.GetDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, masterTrajectoryProfile, length);
var sigma = 1d;
var knownAverageDissimilarity = dissimilarityProfile.Average();
var knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity =
dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++)
{
RunAgainstInputs(masterTrajectoryProfile, knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, sigma, numberOfProfiles);
}
TestContext.WriteLine("False Acceptances: {0}. FAR: {1}%",
_numberOfFalseAcceptances, ((_numberOfFalseAcceptances / (double)numberOfProfiles) * 100));
}
[TestMethod]
public void TestFile()
{
var items =
CMUData.ReadFromFileData(
CSVReader.ReadFile(@"DSL-StrongPasswordData.csv"));
var inputGroups = items.GroupBy(x => new { x.Person, x.SessionIndex });
var length = 20;
TestContext.WriteLine("Person,Session,FalseAcceptances,FAR,FalseRejections,FRR");
foreach (var inputGroup in inputGroups)
{
var localFalseAcceptance = 0;
var localFalseRejection = 0;
var knownInputs = inputGroup.Select(x => x.Data).Skip(45).ToArray();
var userInputs = inputGroup.Select(x => x.Data).Take(45).ToArray();
var masterTrajectoryProfile =
DissimilarityComparison.CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(knownInputs, length);
var dissimilarityProfile =
DissimilarityComparison.GetDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, masterTrajectoryProfile, length);
var sigma = 2d;
var knownAverageDissimilarity = dissimilarityProfile.Average();
var knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity =
dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation();
var notCurrentPerson = inputGroups.Where(x => x.Key.Person !=
inputGroup.Key.Person);
var dataToTest = notCurrentPerson.SelectMany(x => x).Select(x =>
x.Data).ToArray();
var numberOfProfiles = dataToTest.Length;
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for (var i = 0; i < numberOfProfiles; i++)
{
if (
DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid(
masterTrajectoryProfile,
dataToTest[i],
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma)
)
{
localFalseAcceptance++;
_numberOfFalseAcceptances++;
}
}
for (var i = 0; i < 45; i++)
{
if (
DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid(
masterTrajectoryProfile,
userInputs[i],
knownAverageDissimilarity,
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,
sigma)
)
{
localFalseRejection++;
_numberOfFalseRejections++;
}
}
TestContext.WriteLine("{0},{1},{2},{3},{4},{5}",
inputGroup.Key.Person,
inputGroup.Key.SessionIndex,
localFalseAcceptance,
(Convert.ToDouble(localFalseAcceptance) / numberOfProfiles) * 100,
localFalseRejection,
(Convert.ToDouble(localFalseRejection) / 45) * 100);
}
}
}
}
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P Database Script
USE [Thesis]
GO
/****** Object: Table [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts]
Script Date: 2/17/2016
10:11:45 PM ******/
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts](
[Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL,
[Saved] [datetime] NOT NULL,
[IpAddress] [nvarchar](max) NULL,
[Referrer] [nvarchar](max) NULL,
[Url] [nvarchar](max) NULL,
[RequestType] [int] NOT NULL,
[FormInteraction_Id] [int] NULL,
[DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'),
[SignInStatus] [int] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)),
CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED
(
[Id] ASC
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF,
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY]
) ON [PRIMARY] TEXTIMAGE_ON [PRIMARY]
GO
/****** Object: Table [dbo].[FormInfo]
Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM ******/
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[FormInfo](
[Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL,
[Name] [nvarchar](max) NULL,
[Value] [nvarchar](max) NULL,
[ApplicationRequestContext_Id] [int] NULL,
[DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'),
CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.FormInfo] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED
(
[Id] ASC
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF,
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY]
) ON [PRIMARY] TEXTIMAGE_ON [PRIMARY]
GO/****** Object: Table [dbo].[FormInteractions]
Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM
******/
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[FormInteractions](
[Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL,
[DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'),
CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.FormInteractions] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED
(
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[Id] ASC
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF,
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY]
) ON [PRIMARY]
GO
/****** Object: Table [dbo].[KeyboardInteractions]
Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM
******/
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[KeyboardInteractions](
[Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL,
[KeyPressed] [int] NOT NULL,
[FormInteraction_Id] [int] NULL,
[ElementName] [nvarchar](10) NOT NULL,
[AltPressed] [bit] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)),
[CtrlPressed] [bit] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)),
[ShiftPressed] [bit] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)),
[DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'),
[TimeReleased] [decimal](18, 2) NULL DEFAULT ((0)),
[TimePressed] [decimal](18, 2) NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)),
CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.KeyboardInteractions] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED
(
[Id] ASC
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF,
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY]
) ON [PRIMARY]
GO
/****** Object: Table [dbo].[MouseInteractions]
Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM
******/
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[MouseInteractions](
[Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL,
[TimePressed] [datetime] NOT NULL,
[MouseX] [int] NOT NULL,
[MouseY] [int] NOT NULL,
[FormInteraction_Id] [int] NULL,
[Button] [int] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)),
[ElementName] [nvarchar](10) NOT NULL,
[DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'),
CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.MouseInteractions] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED
(
[Id] ASC
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF,
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY]
) ON [PRIMARY]
GO
/****** Object: Table [dbo].[RequestHeaders]
******/
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO

Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM
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SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[RequestHeaders](
[Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL,
[Name] [nvarchar](max) NULL,
[Value] [nvarchar](max) NULL,
[ApplicationRequestContext_Id] [int] NULL,
[DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'),
CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.RequestHeaders] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED
(
[Id] ASC
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF,
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY]
) ON [PRIMARY] TEXTIMAGE_ON [PRIMARY]
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts] WITH CHECK ADD CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] FOREIGN
KEY([FormInteraction_Id])
REFERENCES [dbo].[FormInteractions] ([Id])
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts] CHECK CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id]
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[FormInfo] WITH CHECK ADD CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.FormInfo_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_ApplicationRequestContext_Id] FOREIGN
KEY([ApplicationRequestContext_Id])
REFERENCES [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts] ([Id])
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[FormInfo] CHECK CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.FormInfo_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_ApplicationRequestContext_Id]
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[KeyboardInteractions] WITH CHECK ADD CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.KeyboardInteractions_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] FOREIGN
KEY([FormInteraction_Id])
REFERENCES [dbo].[FormInteractions] ([Id])
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[KeyboardInteractions] CHECK CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.KeyboardInteractions_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id]
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[MouseInteractions] WITH CHECK ADD CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.MouseInteractions_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] FOREIGN
KEY([FormInteraction_Id])
REFERENCES [dbo].[FormInteractions] ([Id])
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[MouseInteractions] CHECK CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.MouseInteractions_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id]
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[RequestHeaders] WITH CHECK ADD CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.RequestHeaders_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_ApplicationRequestContext_Id]
FOREIGN KEY([ApplicationRequestContext_Id])
REFERENCES [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts] ([Id])
GO
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[RequestHeaders] CHECK CONSTRAINT
[FK_dbo.RequestHeaders_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_ApplicationRequestContext_Id]
GO

